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Apart from attempts to account for the 
massive support provided by Egyptian 
writers to President Abd al-Fatah al-Sisi, 
the 25th of January uprising was rarely 
explored from the standpoint of Egyptian 
intellectuals. Yet, during the uprising, 
some did take an active part in the events, 
such as forging an image of the revolu-
tion and its actors through opinion col-
umns. However, by promoting what 
became an iconic image of the Egyptian 
protester—middle class youth, peacefully 
seeking liberty and rights—they drew on 
the same discourses as those adopted by 
their counterparts in the semi-official 
press: the belief that the uprising threat-
ened to unleash the oppressed masses 
who would embark on the destruction of 
the State. This article attempts to shed 
light on the conditions associated with 
the 25th of January revolution by explor-
ing op-eds published in several Egyptian 
private dailies during the first years of the 
uprising. 
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In parallel with the demonstrations that 
filled the streets during Egypt’s most 
recent revolution, an equally important 
battle was taking place in the columns of 
the local press. While protesters were 
demonstrating against Mubarak’s regime, 
opinion writers in private newspapers 
were busy saving the reputation of those 
demonstrating. In their articles, they were 
fighting against the negative framing of 
protesters in the government-influenced 
press, which depicted them as vandals, 
unemployed thugs or foreign conspirators 
willing to destroy the country. To counter 
these accusations, pro-revolutionary col-
umnists promoted what became an iconic 
image of the Egyptian protester: the mid-
dle class youth, peacefully seeking liberty 
and access to rights. Far from being ran-
dom choices, the images and words 
selected to depict the protesters reveal 
the dominant perceptions as to which 
social group had the right to engage in 
protest movements and which did not. 
They also tell us about the type of action 
that was tolerated in protests, how long it 
lasted, and the highest price that was 
acceptable in achieving political change. 
In short, there were certain conditions and 
limits associated with the revolution that 
were set by its normative image. It was 
informed as much by the local political 
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culture and history as by the international 
heritage of previous revolutions. 
This article attempts to shed light on the 
conditions associated with the 25 January 
revolution by exploring opinion columns 
published in several private Egyptian 
newspapers throughout the three years of 
the uprising, i.e. from January 2011 to Jan-
uary 2014. In total, 50 opinion articles were 
analyzed (28 from 2011, 9 from 2012 and 14 
from 2013) from five Egyptian private daily 
newspapers (al-Shurūq, al-Miṣrī al-Yawm, 
al-Taḥrīr, Veto and al-Wafd). There are spe-
cific reasons behind the decision to focus 
on this section of the private Egyptian dai-
lies. While much of the scholarly attention 
has been devoted to the framing strate-
gies adopted by different Egyptian media 
outlets during the uprising (Hamdy and 
Gomaa), the voice of columnists writing in 
these newspapers has remained unex-
plored. Yet, during these years, the com-
mentary section of private Egyptian news-
papers became a privileged space of 
intellectual intervention, where various 
authors shared their views on the events. 
Furthermore, despite the conflicting 
stances adopted by both the private and 
semi-official press towards the uprising, at 
least during the initial 18 days leading up 
to the ousting of the president, Hosni 
Mubarak (Klaus), the commentary section 
presents a striking rhetorical homogeneity 
used to define the revolution and its 
actors. As the uprising progressed, colum-
nists in both sections of the media increas-
ingly came to share similar concerns, 
namely how to prevent the uprising from 
spreading to the popular classes which, 
according to them, threatened to turn the 
revolution into uncontrollable chaos. By 
fighting the negative portrayal of the 
movement as disseminated through the 
semi-official press, columnists were in a 
position to promote a romanticized image 
of the protester, which drew extensively 
on the same discourses as the ones 
adopted by their opponents: the belief 
that the uprising threatened to unleash 
the oppressed masses, who would then 
embark on the destruction of the State. 
Eventually, the main difference between 
the writers employed by the semi-official 
press and those engaged by private news-
papers was their perception of the limits 
they set in relation to the revolution.
I begin by providing some theoretical and 
historical background which will help to 
capture the flavor of one particular news-
paper section, namely the commentary. 
This background is crucial if we are to 
understand the power relations that 
existed within the Egyptian journalistic 
field and which were to determine the var-
ious stances adopted during the uprising. 
Following this, I proceed by considering 
the issue of the use of violence in the 
Egyptian revolution. In the light of the 
stated necessity to adopt peaceful modes 
of protest, outbursts of violence that 
accompanied the uprising prompted 
intellectuals to define the limits between 
the legitimate and unwelcome protest 
groups. Finally, in the last section, I exam-
ine the most common depictions of the 
unwelcome rebels, which were informed 
by the collective fear associated with the 
hunger revolution and the threats this pre-
sented to the survival of the State.
Op-Eds as a Battlefield of the Revolution
Before turning to the various representa-
tions of the protester, it is important to 
provide some theoretical and historical 
tools in order to map the space in which 
they were disseminated. The commentary 
section in a newspaper can be defined as 
a space for opinion, located at the over-
lapping intersection of several institutional 
orders, mainly the fields of journalism, pol-
itics and intellectual activity (Jacobs and 
Townsle 13). Forged in the American con-
text, this definition also seems to corre-
spond well to the Egyptian case, where 
the political stances adopted by private 
newspapers, and the increased signifi-
cance of their op-eds, were largely deter-
mined by the position they occupied in 
the field of Egyptian journalism. After the 
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emergence of the private press in the 
2000s, the protests, strikes and general 
social criticism that surged during the 
same decade were to become the main 
focus of its coverage (Ben Néfissa). Rather 
than simply being a response to political 
sympathies, it was actually a strategy 
aimed at survival in a field dominated by 
semi-official newspapers and journalists. 
Deprived of the privileges usually enjoyed 
by the state-influenced press, such as 
access to sources, private newspapers 
had to become innovative in order to 
establish a new journalistic formula (Bena-
ziz 33-37). Critical, well-informed and elo-
quent commentaries, written by famous 
writers, activists, academics, doctors, 
experts and other members of burgeon-
ing Egyptian civil society, became one of 
the main ingredients in the successful for-
mula adopted by the private press (41-42). 
In their study devoted to opinion pages, 
Ronald N. Jacobs and Eleanor Townsle 
note that columnists often speak with dif-
ferent voices which are not easy to recon-
cile. The position from which they speak 
tends to switch between that of political 
advisor, addressing the elites, and teacher, 
providing the readership with the back-
ground to understand certain events or 
situations. Accordingly, the position of col-
umnists is defined by the tension between 
access to political elites and institutions, 
such as the media, and the commitment 
to detachment, which is more easily 
aligned with the intellectual claim of 
autonomy (Jacobs and Townsle 28). The 
present article suggests that during the 
Egyptian revolution the commentary sec-
tion in private newspapers was defined by 
a similar ambivalence of positions, the 
one seeking to provide the readers with 
informed comment on the situation, and 
the other aiming to promote the interests 
of the movement. In other words, opinion 
authors sympathetic to the protests were 
not only sharing their analysis of the situ-
ation but were also consciously seeking to 
bolster support for the revolution by por-
traying it in a particular way. The battle of 
images and words waged between the 
private and state-influenced press as they 
sought to define the protests provided 
the framework for intellectual engage-
ment during the revolution.
The expansion of opinion pages in private 
newspapers during the revolution is evi-
dence of their increased significance for 
both readers and writers. Large portions 
of Egyptian society began to take a fresh 
interest in politics during the uprising, and 
naturally turned to op-eds in order to 
locate themselves within the new political 
setting. Some newspapers, such as al-Miṣrī 
al-Yawm, attracted up to half a million new 
readers in the first months of the uprising, 
most of whom were particularly interested 
in opinion columns (Klaus). The newspa-
per reacted to this development by pro-
moting its columnists as “those who were 
painting the image of the Tahrir revolu-
tion.”1 The space allocated to opinion col-
umns in the private press increased pro-
portionally; in the daily al-Shurūq it 
expanded, for instance, from one page to 
two. The number of columnists also rose: 
between February and March 2011, 
al-Shurūq welcomed thirty-two new writ-
ers, some of whom were former contribu-
tors who, inspired by the fall of Mubarak, 
had returned to writing.2 For at least the 
first 18 days of the uprising, to write an 
op-ed in a reputable newspaper (i.e. one 
that was not compromised by its previous 
stances towards the movement) was basi-
cally the same as the act of protesting in 
the streets, as is suggested by the ten-
dency of authors to identify themselves 
with protesters, to reproduce slogans in 
their op-eds which were being chanted on 
the streets, or to portray their articles as 
being direct reports from Tahrir Square.3 
As the intellectual legitimacy was rede-
fined according to the stances adopted 
towards the movement, op-eds provided 
the most appropriate space to affirm one’s 
loyalty to the revolution or to salvage one’s 
reputation if it had been soiled by previ-
ous links to Mubarak’s regime.4 The com-
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mentary section of private newspapers 
was also the space where the corruption 
and prejudices of the semi-official media 
were unveiled and denounced, and where 
moves to reform the media institution in 
the “new Egypt” were presented.5 In the 
context of a pitched battle between vari-
ous newspapers, opinion columns 
became an alternative battleground for 
the struggle taking place on the streets, 
with columnists seeking to promote par-
ticular images of the revolution.
Peaceful Revolution and Violent Rebels
Following Mubarak’s resignation, the air in 
Egypt was filled with the lyrical depictions 
of the protesters. Epithets such as “pure,” 
“selfless,” “noble” and “civilized” were 
repeatedly used to describe the move-
ment and its actors. However, in addition 
to these romanticized depictions, there 
were more down-to-earth accounts which 
pointed to the level of education, middle-
class credentials, cosmopolitan profile 
and an allegiance to peaceful modes of 
protest (Ismail, “Urban Subalterns” 865). It 
was these features of the legitimate pro-
tester that commentators invoked when 
they felt that the uprising was going 
beyond its predefined limits. In light of its 
goal of peacefulness, these limits were 
being set in relation to acts of violence.
Non-violent resistance was the official tac-
tic advocated by the organizers of the ini-
tial protests associated with the uprising. 
The famous manual entitled “How to 
Revolt Intelligently” that circulated during 
its first weeks insisted on the need to keep 
protests peaceful, though it endorsed 
actions that might be held to be violent by 
some intellectuals, such as the occupation 
of official buildings. For example, the 
advance of the protesters on the Ministry 
of the Interior, situated in one of the back 
streets of the Tahrir Square, might be con-
demned by many columnists as irrespon-
sible. But revolutions rarely follow a 
planned pathway, and the Egyptian revo-
lution was violent from the very outset. As 
has already been noted by previous stud-
ies, street clashes, the burning down of 
police stations, armored security cars and 
official buildings were to be an integral 
part of the uprising (Ismail, “Urban Subal-
terns”; A. Ḥusayn). In addition to these 
acts, there were other less acceptable real-
ities of the revolution, such as sectarian 
attacks, sexual harassment, looting, street 
crime and other forms of everyday vio-
lence that were feeding the all-pervasive 
rhetoric of al-infilāt al-amnī (“the dissipa-
tion of security”). One has to acknowl-
edge, however, that these realities cannot 
be separated from the overall experience 
of the revolution. If we depart from its 
romantic definition and focus on the soci-
ological one—which understands it as an 
imbrication of multiple indiscernible moti-
vations, aims and perceptions of opportu-
nity (Bennani-Chraïbi and Fillieule) then 
limiting the movement to its fragments to 
which we are sympathetic does not 
advance our objective of understanding 
revolutionary situations. As Samuli 
Schielke has noted, as much as they might 
seem distant, the rising up of Egyptians 
against Mubarak’s rule and the increase in 
street crime were the result of the same 
phenomena: “the broken fear,” which 
undermined social hierarchies at their 
multiple levels.
In line with the activists, columnists in pri-
vate newspapers strongly advocated 
peaceful demonstrations, and expressed 
their concern over the potential for out-
bursts of violence. Commenting on the 
call to protest of the 25th January 2011, a 
columnist in al-Shurūq, for instance, 
invited protesters to offer flowers to the 
police in order to avoid misunderstand-
ings that might lead to violent confronta-
tions (ʿAbdulfattāḥ, “Warda”). The decision 
to focus on non-violent modes of protest 
provided the ground for making compar-
isons between the Egyptian and Tunisian 
revolutions and the wave of uprisings that 
had swept across Central Europe at the 
end of the 1980s (“Rasāʿil”; El-Choubaki, 
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“Li-mā-dhā”). In the manner of these his-
torical precedents, the Egyptian uprising 
was also expected to bring about the 
change in a swift and inexpensive manner. 
The considerable success achieved dur-
ing the initial 18 days seemed to confirm 
these expectations. 
As a result, columnists in private newspa-
pers were keen on limiting the Egyptian 
uprising solely to its peaceful episodes. 
The adherence to the slogan silmiyya 
(“peaceful”) was identified as the condi-
tion for belonging to the revolutionary 
camp, as revealed in the comment written 
by a columnist in al-Miṣrī al-Yawm who 
stated that the act of setting buildings and 
facilities on fire turned revolutionaries into 
“attackers, road bandits and thugs” 
(Ḥusayn, “Al-Qāhira”). Such acts “were not 
a part of the revolution,” asserted the same 
author on another occasion, “and by no 
means are related to it” (“Al-Taḥad̩d̩ur”). 
The perpetrators “were not Egyptians,” 
chimed in another columnist, thus setting 
the limits not only on the revolution, but 
also on Egypt’s national community (Jūda).
It is important also to highlight the tactical 
dimension of the portrayal of the Egyptian 
uprising as being peaceful. Amongst the 
numerous arguments advanced by opin-
ion writers regarding the need to adhere 
to the peaceful modes of the movement, 
two were explicitly strategic in nature. The 
first pointed to the efficiency of non-vio-
lent modes of protest, attested by the suc-
cess achieved during the first 18 days. As 
for the second, it evoked the absolute 
need to retain the support of public opin-
ion, or ḥizb al-kanaba (“the couch party”)6 
as boldly stated by a renowned Egyptian 
activist in al-Miṣrī al-Yawm (ʿAbdulfattāḥ, 
Silmiyya). Accordingly, one of the most 
common and efficient strategies employed 
to bolster support for the revolution was 
to attribute acts of violence, crime and 
lawlessness to the agents of the Mubarak 
regime. It was maintained that various par-
ties of the former regime were acting 
behind the scenes with the intention of 
distorting the image of the revolution. In 
order to preserve the image of the upris-
ing as peaceful, some columnists openly 
invited protesters to treat those who 
engaged in violence as “outsiders” 
(dukhalāʾ) in relation of the revolution (ʿAlī 
Ḥasan; ʿAbdulfattāḥ).
However, the line between revolution and 
infiltration was to become blurred, as it 
was constantly being redefined according 
to the situation. As the uprising pro-
gressed, and street clashes proliferated, it 
was increasingly difficult to maintain the 
peaceful image of the movement. The two 
stormy winters of 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 
produced notable shifts in the arguments 
justifying the advent of violence. The five-
day clashes that erupted in November 
2011 in Muhammad Mahmud Street, and 
the emergence of the Ultras as a powerful 
political force after the Port Said massacre 
in February 2012, convinced some intel-
lectuals that violence was deplorable but 
an inevitable reality of the revolution. The 
soaring anger against the rule of the Mus-
lim Brotherhood that became widespread 
the following winter, which led to clashes 
and the torching of many Brotherhood 
offices throughout the country, definitely 
succeeded in burying the dream of a 
peaceful transition. It was during these 
months that, in contrast with previous 
years, violence started to be seen not only 
as a legitimate, but also as a necessary 
political solution (Schielke). The gradual 
adjustments in relation to the use of the 
slogan silmiyya in op-eds serves as a 
barometer against which to measure the 
progressive legitimation of violence. 
Street clashes that marked the end of 2011 
led to a redefinition of the principle of the 
peaceful protest by including in its scope 
a definition of a defensive application of 
violence. A columnist in al-Miṣrī al-Yawm 
explained: “throwing stones against those 
who shower us with tear-gas is a peaceful 
act, as well as burning down police sta-
tions that unleash on our demonstrations 
dangerous offenders. Retreat is the oppo-
site of a peaceful act, it’s cowardice” 
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(Samīr). At the end of the following year, 
which was marked by a series of demon-
strations organized by the Muslim Brother-
hood in protest against the deposing of 
President Mohammad Morsi, the slogan 
silmiyya witnessed another shift in mean-
ing: it came to be seen as the opposite of 
demonstrations that impeded the traffic, 
or during which posters were raised criti-
cizing the army (Ḥusayn, “Widāʿan”). 
Despite these shifts, the silmiyya slogan 
was not abandoned, as in the eyes of 
some columnists it embodied the very 
legitimacy of the Egyptian revolution.
The Spectre of a Hunger Revolution
The fear of violence that emerged in op-
eds during the first year of the revolution 
was supported by certain collective repre-
sentations of the Egyptian poor. The words 
used to describe perpetrators of reported 
or anticipated violence reveal the prevail-
ing belief that the uprising should be pre-
vented from spreading to the popular 
classes because it might result in chaos. 
The acts of violence were mostly attrib-
uted to forces related to the worlds of 
crime and poverty, such as “road-bandits” 
(qattāʿa al-ţuruq), “ex-convicts” (arbāb 
al-sawābiq), “individuals with dangerous 
criminal records” (musajjalīn khaţr), “riff-
raff” (al-ghawghāʾ), “the depressed” 
(al-muḥbitīn), “lost youth” (al-shabāb 
al-d̩āʿī), street children, and the “proverbial 
thug” (balṭajiyya). In fact, it was mostly rep-
resentations of the poverty-stricken as 
being groups naturally prone to violence 
and crime that were used to promote a 
positive image of the revolution.
The portrayal of the poor as being inclined 
to crime was not new. It was supported by 
the deep-rooted representations associ-
ated with popular areas in Cairo, identify-
ing them as centers of crime, moral deg-
radation and unruly conduct. As the works 
of Salwa Ismail have shown, since at least 
the 1980s these representations have 
been widely used in the official discourse 
in order to justify the enhanced security 
controls employed in popular quarters 
(“Political Life”). The image of these urban 
areas as sites of a generalized chaos are 
maintained by means of popular culture; 
for example by the films of the Egyptian 
filmmaker Khaled Youssef, who has made 
the subject of informal neighborhoods his 
favorite topic, and also as a result of 
numerous commentaries in the press that 
have portrayed them as “the belts of dyna-
mite” encircling Cairo’s middle class quar-
ters which have the potential to explode 
at any moment and invade them (Muntașir). 
During the uprising, such predictions and 
the fears they invoked became particularly 
prominent. As suggested by the initial 
interpretations of the protests in Tunisia 
that were published in the Egyptian press 
before they spread to Egypt, the sponta-
neous reading of the uprising in Egypt 
was that of a rebellion led by the poor 
(Kreil and Sabaseviciute). These fears 
derive from the pervasive rhetoric of “the 
revolution of the hungry ones” (thawrat 
al-jiyāʿ), which is deeply embedded in 
Egyptian social and political discourse. 
According to the narrative, hunger rebel-
lions are inevitably destructive as they 
sweep away everything that stands in their 
way, or “devour the green and the dry” 
(yaʾkul al-akhd̩ar wa al-yābis) as the favored 
Arab expression has it. These rebellions 
are portrayed as being driven by the sheer 
desire for revenge and savagery, drawing 
on classical literary illustrations of the ani-
malization of the poverty-stricken (Poli). 
The image of balṭajiyya, the term com-
monly used in Egypt to define hit-men 
working on the payroll of various groups 
and replacing the rule of law, is the 
embodiment of the fear of the poor. Tell-
ingly, during the uprising the figure of the 
illiterate and hungry thug was used by 
both sides on the frontline, i.e. those who 
accused the protesters in Tahrir of being 
effectively “bought” with meals from Ken-
tucky Fried Chicken, and those who 
imputed violence to the thugs employed 
by the former regime.
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It should be noted, however, that the poor 
in general were included in the uprising, 
and their presence provided it with the 
legitimacy associated with a “revolution of 
the entire people.” Nevertheless, the role 
attributed to them in opinion articles 
reveal the perceived need to preserve the 
firmly established social hierarchies, even 
in times of revolution. The urban poor 
were recognized as a revolutionary force 
mainly when they acted in unity with the 
protesters in Tahrir, helping them to pro-
tect neighbourhoods and properties from 
looters (El-Choubaki, “Thawra”; Farīd). On 
these occasions, they were also identified 
by reference to the positively connoted 
term, al-busațāʾ (“the poor”). As Lucie 
Ryzova has argued, the battle in Moham-
mad Mahmud, led mostly by socially mar-
ginalized young men, might have been 
forgotten if it had not been for their spatial 
connection to the Square, populated by 
the predominantly middle-class crowd. In 
most cases, however, the underprivileged 
were generally held responsible for turn-
ing the revolution into chaos. It was the 
threat of infiltration on the part of the poor 
that a commentator in al-Shurūq evoked 
when arguing against labour and civil ser-
vant protests that spread across Egypt 
after the downfall of Mubarak: 
In contrast to the civilized behaviour 
of the protesters in Tahrir and other 
squares, most of the sectorial demonst-
rations that have appeared lately might 
lead to unparalleled chaos […]. Some 
of these demonstrations have already 
degenerated as they were infiltrated 
by frustrated rabble who engage in the 
random destructions of public facilities 
[…]. As protests spread, some of them 
felt that it was their golden hour to re-
gain their lost rights. And then, they 
tried to snatch for themselves what 
they saw as their right. (Husayn, “An 
taʾatī”, tansl. by the author) 
The fear that the poverty-stricken might 
be tempted to exact justice through their 
own actions became constant fodder for 
the argument that the role of the police 
and the authority of the State should be 
urgently restored (Abū al-Ghār “Intikāsa”; 
Ḥadīdī).
Given the entrenched fear of a hunger 
revolution, it was in the interest of pro-rev-
olutionary intellectuals to portray the 25th 
January uprising as something entirely dif-
ferent. This was achieved by stressing the 
difference between political revolutions, 
defined as quests for freedom, and social 
rebellions, driven by the sole desire to fill 
empty stomachs (al-Ghazzālī; Fad̩l; 
Muntașir, “Fāriq”). The difference between 
these two movements was crucial as it pre-
determined their outcomes, a fact noted 
by an academic in al-Shurūq, who stated 
that revolts sparked by “the violation of 
basic needs, such as eating, drinking and 
reproducing” result in “replacing the dic-
tator with a new one, more capable of 
responding to basic animal needs, but at 
the expense of providing for basic human 
needs” (ʿAbdulfattāḥ, “Ḥayawānyya”). 
Social questions were indeed on the revo-
lutionary agenda, according to the com-
mentators, but they were dependent on 
political solutions, such as the introduction 
of free elections and the establishment of 
democracy (ʿIsā). The hierarchy of 
demands (Abdelrahman) reflected the 
belief that the uprising should remain in 
the hands of the youth encamped in Tahrir.
Related to that is one of the most common 
arguments used to promote the 25th Jan-
uary uprising, i.e. the claim that the latter 
saved Egypt from an impending hunger 
revolution. According to this argument, 
those who trembled at the prospect of a 
rebellion by the poor should have been 
grateful to the middle class youth who had 
taken on the responsibility for addressing 
the disastrous economic situation. They 
had been responsible for the inclusion of 
social demands in the slogans chanted in 
Tahrir, such as the demands for bread and 
social justice, and this was seen as a prom-
ise to save the country from the potential 
of a destructive class struggle (ʿAlawī). 
“Since 2010 I knew that “chaos” (fawd̩ā) 
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was about to come […] (triggered) by the 
lost youth without hope or perspectives 
from informal neighborhoods”, confessed 
a columnist in al-Shurūq. “But the great 
revolution has stopped this from happen-
ing for the time being” (Abū al-Ghār, “Al-
thawra”, transl. by the author). The phrase 
“for the time being” is important here, as 
the threat of a hunger revolution would be 
evoked in the future every time the revolu-
tion revealed any perceived shortcom-
ings. In contemporary Egypt, the image of 
an uncontrollable and destructive rebel-
lion led by the poor serves as a barometer 
to measure the level of discontent against 
those in power. During the three years of 
the uprising, it was regularly used to 
threaten those in power: the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF),7 the 
Muslim Brotherhood8 and the current rule 
of Abdel Fatah al-Sisi.9 Not surprisingly, 
the coup (or the revolution) led by al-Sisi 
on the 30th July to depose Mohammad 
Morsi was also popularly credited as hav-
ing saved the country from a rebellion on 
the part of the poor.10 The level of political 
significance attributed to this image 
reveals that the representations of the 
poor as a potentially destructive force 
were shared across the spectrum of polit-
ical affiliations.
Conclusion
The ambivalence that surrounds the rep-
resentations of the rebels reveals one of 
the most significant dilemmas that faced 
Egyptian intellectuals during the uprising: 
How to make a revolution in a world per-
ceived as being Hobbesian? In other 
words, how to liberate a society without 
liberating certain classes whose involve-
ment in the revolution might prove to be 
fatal for the survival of the State?
As indicated by the words and images 
used by columnists to define the legiti-
mate protester, the fears that the uprising 
might unleash forces leading to chaos 
proved to be a constant feature of the rev-
olution. The conviction that Egyptian soci-
ety was being exposed to internal threats 
reveals the prevalence of a certain political 
philosophy among Egyptian intellectuals, 
resting on the view that tends to see the 
State as a mostly coercive institutional 
power to which all the citizens are bound 
to fearfully demonstrate their respect 
(Goldberg and Zaki). It is revealing to 
observe how the representation of these 
forces shifted throughout the revolution. 
During the first years of the uprising, they 
were defined in terms of poverty and 
crime in line with the dominant represen-
tations of the poor in Egyptian popular 
culture. These representations expose 
inherent conviction that a revolution is a 
risky venture in a country where the over-
whelming majority of the inhabitants live 
below the poverty line. There was a fear 
that the poor would act alone, without 
waiting until the perceived higher political 
aims that had been expressed by the 
youth in Tahrir had been achieved. These 
arguments echo Hanna Arendt’s reflec-
tions that maintain that “revolutions for 
freedom” are impossible in countries 
which suffer from acute poverty, where the 
satisfaction of bodily needs is defined by 
reference to urgency. Since the winter of 
2012-2013, when the figure of the unwel-
come rebels shifted from the hungry thug 
to the Muslim Brother, the fears it embod-
ied were expressed less by social than by 
political vocabulary. The vision of the revo-
lution advocated by columnists sympa-
thetic to the uprising was thus limited from 
the beginning.
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7 In July and October 2011, 
two pages entitled “the 
revolution of the hungry is 
approaching” (thawra al-jiyyāʿ 
qādima) were created on 
Facebook in order to criticize 
the repressive measures 
against protesters adopted 
by the military council.
8 The anti-Muslim 
Brotherhood newspaper Veto 
devoted its 29th January 
2013 issue to the hunger 
revolution, maintaining 
that the living conditions 
of the poor had worsened 
during Muhammad Morsi’s 
presidency.
9 For example, “Khubarā: ʿAla 
al-abwāb thawra al-jiyyāʿ.” 
al-Miṣrīyūn, 18 May 2015. See, 
also, the excerpt entitled 
“Thawra al-jiyyāʿ: Al-țūfān 
al-qādim ʿala Mișr” screened 
on the Muslim Brotherhood 
affiliated channel al-




1 See al-Miṣrī al-Yawm 
from the 6th February 2011 
onwards.
2 This observation is based 
on the study of op-eds 
published in al-Shurūq 
between the 11th February 
and the 30th March 2011.
3 See, for instance, a series 
of articles by Amr Hamzawi 
entitled “From Tahrir Square”, 
published in al-Shurūq 
between the 4th and the 19th 
February 2011.
4 It was a widespread 
practice for politicians to 
start writing in the private 
press after their resignation 
from official positions, as 
well as for columnists who 
were associated with the 
semi-official press before the 
revolution.
5 See, for instance, countless 
op-eds devoted to the 
criticism of the semi-official 
media in al-Miṣrī al-Yawm in 
March 2011.
6 A derogatory term referring 
to the “silent majority” of 
Egyptians who followed 
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